In my previous post I presented some reasons to resist a clever counterexample to the Law of Likelihood developed by Mike Titelbaum. In that post I chose to stay at the level of intuitions about the example and about what kinds of features we might want a measure of evidential favoring to have. In this post I go deeper by examining Mike’s example in light of the purpose of the Law of Likelihood. [Read more…]
To paraphrase Larisa in Pasternak’s Dr. Zhivago (chapter 13, §16), philosophy is like horseradish. It is good if taken in small amounts in combination with other things. But it is not good in large amounts by itself.
–Teddy Seidenfeld in Bayesian Statistics 2, p. 264
Do you agree? Why or why not?
Carnap has stated that the ultimate justification of the axioms [of inductive logic] is inductive intuition. I do not consider this answer an adequate basis for a concept of rationality. Indeed, I think that every attempt…to ground the concept of rational degree of belief in logical probability suffers from the same unacceptable apriorism.
–Wes Salmon, 1988, 13
It is wonderful when a student in an introductory philosophy course understands for the first time that you can evaluate what passes for an argument in popular discourse in a principled way by formalizing it and then evaluating its logical form and the plausibility of each of its premises.
However, this process can be potentially misleading. [Read more…]